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Since terminability and remedies available to the aggrieved
party to a lease of personal services are dependent on the types
of contract involved, the most important problem facing the
courts is determining whether the contract is for a term, by a
term, or at will. When the agreement sets definite or ascer-
tainable dates for commencement and termination, this task is
not difficult. If there is no set term, that the salary is fixed
at so much per designated period does not alone raise a pre-
sumption that the term is for or by that designated period; it is
necessary to consider other terms of the contract, the circum-
stances surrounding the employment, and the nature of the work
to determine the type of contract involved.
Employment by the term is terminable only at the expiration
of each agreed term; if neither party terminates the contract
at that time, employment continues to be by the term. Employ-
ment for a term is terminated upon expiration of the agreed
term; if the parties continue the relationship beyond the term
without a new agreement the employment becomes one at will.
Either party to an employment at will may recede at any time
without cause.
An employee hired for or by the term and who is either dis-
charged without cause or leaves with just cause before expira-
tion of the term is entitled to salary for the unexpired term of
the contract. An employer whose employee leaves without cause
before expiration of the term should be entitled to retain unpaid
wages and to a return of all wages paid "in advance" of services.
The employer who discharges an employee for cause before ex-
Piration of the term may recover damages to compensate for
the alleged wrong and the resulting inconvenience of finding
another employee.
Frank Fontenot
PROBLEMS IN DESCRIPTIONS OF LAND IN LOUISIANA
The Civil Code requirement that all sales of immovable
property be in writing appears to recognize the untrustworthi-
ness of oral testimony, which may be affected by various factors
such as insufficient understanding, poor memory, and bad faith.'
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2275 (1870) : "Every transfer of immovable property
1963]
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The property description, being an integral part of a sale, must
be in writing, thus assuring that it be, as far as possible, inde-
pendent of individuals' morality and of the difficulties brought
about by the passage of time.
The written act of sale normally provides an adequate de-
scription; but borderline cases occur in which it is doubtful
whether the instrument is sufficiently complete to identify the
object of the sale. If the description is so incomplete that the
property the parties had in mind cannot be identified, the pur-
pose of the requirement that the sale be in writing is not satis-
fied; the very dangers underlying the requirement of proof in
writing arise: lack of understanding, poor memory, bad faith.
Only when the writing does identify the property to the exclu-
sion of any other may parol evidence be used to locate the prop-
erty with reference to other property.
2
Ambiguous or incomplete and erroneous descriptions are to
be distinguished. Ambiguity may require reference to other
writings, since the "writing" used to identify property need not
be the recorded act of sale. If, however, the property is clearly
identified, but erroneously describes land belonging to another,
the act of sale conveys nothing.
3
Questions of the sufficiency of an ambiguous or incomplete
description may arise in actions to enforce contracts, in prob-
lems of prescription, or in problems involving notice to third
parties. 4 The terms employed by the parties as well as references
to other sources of information are important to establish iden-
tity. In the last situation the question is usually not whether
the writing or writings restrict the object to some certain prop-
erty, but whether the object is sufficiently identified by the
recorded instrument to put third parties on notice of prior trans-
actions involving the property.
must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property,
be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who
confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made
of the immovable property thus sold."
2. Walker v. Ferchaud, 210 La. 283, 26 So. 2d 746 (1946) ; Barfield v.
Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2452 (1870) : "The sale of a thing belonging to an-
other person is null ...... This article applies to judicial sales. Taylor v. Gen-
eral Gas Corp., 87 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Keller, 22 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) ; Guidry v. Sigler, 21 So. 2d 232
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).




RIGHTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
The property intended to be conveyed by a sale must be so
identified in the written act or other instrument made part of
the act by reference that the object is certain. The following
descriptions have been held to identify sufficiently the object:
"Prudhomme Place," 5 "a certain 80-acre tract of land laying
broadside with the 160-acre tract that he now lives on," "124
Stella Street, on grounds measuring about 60 x 150 as per title, ' 7
and "all my land in Lafourche Parish."" The following have
been held insufficient to satisfy the requirement that contracts
for the sale of real estate must be in writing because the prop-
erty was inadequately identified: "Received from Mr. Clifton
Lemoine $35.00 for payment on place," a declaration on a note
that it was given as "the price of certain lands in the Parish of
St. Tammany,"'10 and "Received from Archie Jackson in full pay-
ment of land ($600) Six Hundred Dollars."'1 In each of these
cases parol evidence was held inadmissible to show that the
landowner had contracted to transfer certain real property.
Comparison of the cases in the first group with those in the
second indicates that a writing will be held sufficient when it
identifies the particular property intended to be conveyed, al-
though the description is incomplete; it will be held insufficient
when parol evidence is required to identify the object, even
though an intent to transfer may be clearly indicated. One de-
scription identifies particular property; the other does not. The
5. Barfield v. Saunders, 116 La. 136, 141, 40 So. 593, 595 (1906). The court
said: "The place was as well known under that name, 'Prudhomme Place', as
other places whose boundaries are well defined in a deed." The court then pro-
ceeded to describe clearly the property in question by terminal points and angles.
In Saunders v. Bolden, 155 La. 136, 140, 98 So. 867, 868 (1924), where the
property was described as "the Judie Lewis place," the court said: "There is no
question about the 'thing sold or intended to be sold.' " In this case both identity
and location were apparently well known.
6. Guice v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924). The sale was verbal,
but the written receipt for it was held to satisfy the requirement of a writing
for the transfer of immovables. The question of sufficiency of the description
in the receipt to identify the property was not raised. It is obvious from the
reported facts that identify was no problem.
7. Walker v. Ferchaud, 210 La. 283, 26 So. 2d 746 (1946).
8. Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., 214 La. 750, 758, 38 So. 2d 729, 731(1948), 25 TUL. L. REV. 424 (1951). Although it did not mention the question
of identity, the court stated: "Indeed, the act transferred title to Downman in
accordance with the clear and expressed intent of Martin. True enough, defend-
ant could have demanded from Martin a precise description of the tract to pro-
tect itself from claims of third persons and it would have been entitled to a
reformation if Martin had refused the request."
9. Lemoine v. Lacour, 28 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ; see Note, 21
TUL. L. REV. 706 (1947).
10. Ducre v. Milner, 165 La. 433, 115 So. 646 (1928).
11. Jackson v. Harris, 136 So. 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
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difference is striking when "all my land in Lafourche Parish"
and "certain lands in the Parish of St. Tammany" are con-
trasted.
The courts do not always make clear that parol evidence is
admitted only to determine the exact location and measurements
of property already identified, and not to identify the property
itself. In Walker v. Ferchaud, in which the property was de-
scribed as "124 Stella Street, on grounds measuring about 60 x
150, as per title," the court said: "We concede that the property
which is the object of the contract is not sufficiently described
in the written contract to identify it with certainty, but we think
the district judge erred in sustaining the exception in this case,
for the reason that on a trial of the case on its merits parol evi-
dence is admissible for the purpose of making such an identifi-
cation."'1 2 Later in the opinion the court quoted from another
case, "'What we do is ascertain where 6 Washington Place is.
We locate this street number in a given place by oral proof,' 13
thus indicating that the description was adequate to identify and
the parol evidence was admitted to locate the property more
specifically. 14 It has been said that "parol evidence to establish
identity is allowable ... but this is only in cases where there is
a sufficient body in the description to leave the title substan-
tially resting on writing, and not essentially on parol." I 5 This
language should not be taken to mean that parol is admissible
to identify an object that cannot be identified by the written
evidence. So to construe it would contravene the requirement
that a contract for the sale of an immovable be in writing. If
the object is not identified by written evidence, the agreement to
transfer must fall for lack of an essential element of the con-
tract; if it is so identified, the agreement may be augmented
by parol to show locations. Thus, the courts have not strictly
construed the Code's admonition that "neither shall parol evi-
dence be admitted against or beyond what is contained in the
acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the time of
making them, or since,"'16 for parol evidence is admissible to
resolve uncertainty in the property's description.
12. 210 La. 283, 286, 26 So. 2d 746, 747 (1946).
13. Id. at 290, 26 So. 2d at 748.
14. In Lemoine v. Lacour, 28 So. 2d 784, 785 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946), the
court said that "parol evidence is admissible to make certain the identification of
the property, provided the written agreement contains some description which
can be identified."
15. Kernan v. Baham, 45 La. Ann. 799, 810, 13 So. 155, 159 (1893) (prop-
erty described as tract of 659 acres on Tangipahoa River).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2276 (1870). The courts have not construed this
[Vol. XXIII.
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Aids Within the Instrument That Clarify Descriptions '
The common sense of the Civil Code rescues the unwary
vendee from the consequences of faulty descriptions to some ex-
tent by the provision that the "seller is bound to explain himself
clearly respecting the extent of his obligation: any obscure or
ambiguous clause is construed against him."' "7 This article has
been applied when parol evidence was held admissible to clarify
or reform a description.' 8 The Civil Code does not, however, pro-
vide specific attributes of an adequate description. 19
When it has been determined that the description, though
incomplete, identified the property, other aids are available for
determining the boundaries or locations of a land line.2° In
order of importance, they are natural monuments, artificial
monuments, distances, courses, and quantity, with the con-
trolling consideration being intention of the parties.21  Thus,
strictly, but have admitted parol evidence to locate property that has been suf-
ficiently identified. Close v. Rowan, 171 La. 263, 130 So. 350 (1930) ; Kernan
v. Baham, 45 La. Ann. 799, 13 So. 155 (1893) ; Jackson v. Harris, 18 La. App.
484, 136 So. 350 (2d Cir. 1931), reinstated on rehearing, 18 La. App. 484, 137
So. 655 (2d Cir. 1931). Further, in Walker v. Ferchaud, 210 La. 283, 26 So. 2d
746 (1946), parol evidence was admitted to locate real property described in a
written contract to purchase. For further discussion of consequences of the rule
that title to immovable property cannot be established by parol, see Notes, 18
LA. L. REV. 746 (1958), 17 LA. L. REV. 197 (1956) ; cf. Comment, Parol Evi-
dence To Vary a Recital of Consideration, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941), particu-
larly at 431, where the French rule of "commencement of proof in writing" is
discussed.
17. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2474 (1870). Id. arts. 854, 2491-2499 deal with
discrepancies between the quantity of land sold and that delivered. They per-
haps also clarify art. 2474; according to one French writer they do. See 2
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1457 (1959). Although Articles 2491-2499 seem to
protect from the consequences of faulty descriptions, they relate to quantity and
not to specificity. The value of Article 2474 lies in its application to situations
where there is not necessarily discrepancy in measure but ambiguity in descrip-
tion.
18. Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150. 193 So. 570 (1940) ; Birch v. Watson,
23 So. 2d 345, 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945), in which the court said: "Where the
description in a deed is. ambiguous and subject to two or more interpretations,
the intention of the parties is to be sought, and the intention may be shown by
parol evidence and by the acts and conduct of the parties with reference to the
property sold." The court did not, however, deal with Article 2474.
19. The legislature attempted to remedy this situation by passing acts pro-
viding for the Louisiana Coordinate System in describing property. Although this
may be of assistance in the future, the timidity with which it was proposed is
reflected in the provision: "Nothing contained in this chapter requires any pur-
chaser or mortgagee to rely on a description any part of which depends exclu-
sively upon the Louisiana Coordinate System." LA. R.S. 50:9 (1950).
20. These aids are also in use in other American jurisdictions. See 11 C.J.S.
Boundaries § 50 (1938). See generally C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 39 (1955)
for a discussion of problems in description of property.
21. City of New Orleans v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 24 So. 2d
275 (1946) ; Dufrene v. Bernstein, 190 La. 66, 181 So. 859 (1938) ; Administra-
tors of Tulane Educational Fund v. Stair, 148 La. 11, 86 So. 595 (1920) ; Meyer
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identification of land by acreage or quantity is the weakest of
the enumerated guides in describing property; and, in the ab-
sence of additional specific and definite calls which identify and
locate the property, they are not descriptions adequate to trans-
fer title.2 2 Further, an acreage description does not enlarge or
restrict a grant described by specific bounds, but only conveys
the property within such bounds.23
Aids Without the Instrument That Clarify Descriptions
Maps and plats are particularly useful in identifying prop-
erty and often control when land is sold with reference to
them.24 If they are annexed to the deed, they become part of
the description, 25 and their control is certain. If merely referred
to, their efficacy is questionable. 2  Maps and plats are subject
to the same kind of construction to resolve error or ambiguity
that governs the remainder of the description.27 Thus, a plat
made from field notes yields to the latter in case of discrepancy,
v. Comegys, 147 La. 851, 86 So. 307 (1920) ; Carlisle v. Graves, 64 So. 2d 456
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1953). BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 256 (4th ed. 1951) defines
call as "a visible natural object or landmark designated in a patent, entry, grant,
or other conveyance of lands, as a limit or boundary to the land described, with
which the points of surveying must correspond."
22. Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So. 2d 392
(1958); City of New Orleans v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 24
So. 2d 275 (1945) ; Nelson, Curtis & Nelson v. Bridgeman, 152 La. 190, 92 So.
855 (1922) ; Bender v. Chew, 129 La. 849, 56 So. 1023 (1911).
23. Molichek v. Perriloux, 231 La. 849, 93 So. 2d 190 (1957); City of New
Orleans v. Rathborne, 209 La. 93, 24 So. 2d 275 (1945) ; Romero v. Rader, 160
La. 40, 106 So. 667 (1925).
24. Christina v. Gutreaux, 12 Orl. App. 357 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1915).
25. Werk v. Leland University, 155 La. 971, 99 So. 716 (1924); Gray v.
Coco, 113 La. 33, 36 So. 878 (1904).
26. Isacks v. Deutsch, 114 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) indicates that
a map referred to controls. The survey was recorded, and the map or plat of
the subdivision showed none of the lots fronted literally on Bayou Rouville. To
give effect to defendant's contention that his lot fronted on the bayou would have
been to approve as controlling four words in the descriptions, "fronting on Bayou
Rouville," rather than the plat of the subdivision. The court followed the plat.
But see Gauthier v. Lovas, 35 So. 2d 874, 878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948), in which
the court stated: "The deed specifically states that the plat of survey is annexed
for reference, therefore not constituting a part of the deed. The description of
the property then controls." In Burt v. Valois, 144 So. 2d 196, 209 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962), the court seemed to resolve this problem when it said that "in
the event of conflict between the worded description of real property appearing
in a deed and a map to which reference in the deed is made for further identifica-
tion of the property intended to be conveyed, the map controls." Careful reading
of the description will show that the plat was attached to the description and
recorded with it.
27. Mahaffey v. Miller, 159 La. 610, 105 So. 731 (1925). Inconsistencies are
harmonized by eliminating the features of lower rank in evidence and giving
effect to those of higher rank. Note 22 supra.
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-on the rational basis that the latter are the better evidence of
where the line was run in the field.
28
Competent evidence of what was originally transferred will
aid in establishing the validity of subsequent transfers because
of the code provision of preference for the title of most ancient
date. 29 On the other hand, if the description in a deed is clear,
language indicating the vendor intended to convey the identical
real estate conveyed by a former deed does not necessarily af-
fect the description in the present deed.30
Reformation is a device useful in curing both ambiguous and
erroneous descriptions. 31 Its purpose is to reform the deed to
conform to the true intent of the parties; it is well settled in
Louisiana that an error in the description of land in a deed can
be corrected as long as no third person has acquired any rights
which would be prejudiced by the correction . 2 However, ref or-
mation cannot be had when the grantor has failed to set out in
writing calls, boundaries, and directives that identify the prop-
28. Louisiana Central Lumber Co. v. Stephenson, 13 La. App. 671, 128 So.
696 (2d Cir. 1930).
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 847 (1870).
30. Bender v. Chew, 129 La. 849, 56 So. 1023 (1912). See also Nelson, Curtis
& Nelson v. Bridgeman, 152 La. 190, 203, 92 So. 855, 860 (1922) in which the
court said: "In the sale of real property, a strong presumption obtains that the
deed, as executed, properly describes and conveys all of the land intended to be
conveyed." This does not conflict with the theory that a written act of sale that
does not sufficiently identify the property may be enlarged by reference to other
writings. References to other writings are unnecessary when the property is ade-
quately identified in the deed.
31. Comment, Reformation of Instruments in Louisiana, 30 TUL. L. REV. 486
(1956). On the usefulness of parol in reformation, the court said in Waller v.
Colvin, 151 La. 765, 771, 92 So. 328, 331 (1922) : "In such cases, the attempt
is not to prove by parol a sale of immovable property, nor to contradict a valid
existing written instrument, but to show that the instrument does not express
the meaning and intention of the contracting parties." As to the use of parol in
reformation see Birch v. Watson, 23 So. 2d 345, 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945):
"Where the description in a deed is ambiguous and subject to two or more in-
terpretations, the intention of the parties is to be sought, and the intention may
be shown by parol evidence and by the acts and conduct of the parties with
reference to the property sold."
32. Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So. 2d 392
(1958) ; Broussard v. Succession of Broussard, 164 La. 913, 114 So. 834 (1927)
Giovanovich v. Breda's Widow and Heirs, 149 La. 402, 89 So. 251 (1921)
Brown v. Glass, 3 La. App. 38 (2d Cir. 1925). But see Bender v. Chew, 129
La. 849, 856, 56 So. 1023, 1026 (1911) : "The decisions of this court are not
favorable to the remodeling of deeds in which third persons, as in this instance,
have an interest as owners. There is a long line of pertinent decisions on the
subject, the reading of which will give rise to the conclusion that an action,
such as this, cannot, as a general proposition, be maintained against a stranger
to the deed, who becomes the owner." When the purpose of reformation is to
remove land belonging to another from the description, the court has available
the logical presumption that the vendor did not intend to convey land which he
did not own. However, omissions and inclusions of the vendor's land present a
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erty sought to be conveyed.3 3 If it were otherwise, parol would
be used to identify property not identified by the writing
rather than to show that the writing does not express the inten-
tion of the parties, which is the sole function of reformation.
PRESCRIPTION
The requirements for ten years' acquisitive prescription of
land set forth in the Civil Code include good faith on the part
of the possessor, a just title, and possession of the property in
question . 4 To determine whether the description in a deed is
adequate for just title, the courts have apparently employed the
same criterion used to determine its adequacy as a conveyance
between the parties - the description can support prescription
if the land can be identified by the deed or written instruments
referred to in the deed.35 In Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor,36 de-
fendant set up his chain of title by comparing prior deeds with
each other and with government surveys. He was permitted to
refer to written documents other than his deed to identify the
property in question as that included in his deed. In Harrill v.
Pitts,37 the court clarified the rule that identification is permis-
sible by reference to writings other than the deed.
The rule allowing extrinsic evidence to sustain a deed for
ten years' acquisitive prescription is inapplicable if the deed
rests only on unauthorized or illegal surveys.35 Nor can a de-
fendant claiming title by prescription use the description, or
different and more difficult problem. E.g., W. B. Thompson & Co. v. McNair,
199 La. 918, 7 So. 2d 184 (1942).
33. Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So. 2d 392
(1958).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3478-3498 (1870). See also Comments, Just Title
in the Prescription of Immovables, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436 (1941), 32 TuL. L. REV.
150 (1957).
35. Texas Co. v. O'Meara, 228 La. 474, 82 So. 2d 769 (1955) ; Leader Realty
Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 266, 84 So. 648, 651 (1920) : "As authority for the
doctrine that, when such error in the description in a deed are explained, the
deed will support the prescription of 10 years in defence of the title intended to
be conveyed by the deed, see Frantom v. Nelson, 142 La. 850, 77 South. 767."
36. 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920).
37. 194 La. 123, 134, 193 So. 562, 565 (1940): "The rule that the descrip-
tion in a deed will be sustained whenever the instrument affords any description
by which the property can be identified, either through the description in the
deed itself or by means of extrinsic, competent evidence, has been frequently ap-
proved by this court." The court indicated that a deed which is sufficient between
the parties is likewise sufficient as a basis for ten-year prescription.
38. Bergeron v. Babin, 167 La. 833, 120 So. 384 (1929) ; Mahaffey v. Miller,
159 La. 610, 105 So. 731 (1925) ; City of Shreveport v. Simon, 132 La. 69, 60
So. 795 (1913) ; Melancon v. Bringer, 13 La. Ann. 206 (1858).
[Vol. XXIII
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errors therein, of another's deed; he must stand on the descrip-
tion in his own deed.89
NOTICE TO THIRD PARTIES
Concerning rights of third parties, the primary question is
not whether the writing restricts the object to some certain
property, but whether the object is identified sufficiently by the
recorded instrument to put third parties on notice of any prior
transactions involving the property. In the case of ambiguous
or inaccurate descriptions, there is still no jurisprudential cri-
terion for the sufficiency of a description to constitute notice.
40
If, for example, a third party bought property described by
terminal points and angles from a vendor who had previously
sold the same property under the description "Prudhomme
Place," the third party would not necessarily be put on notice,
even though the description sufficiently identifies the property
between the parties. The phrase, "also all other lands, tenements
and real estate of every description not heretofore particularly
described ... to which he is legally entitled in the State of Lou-
isiana,"' 1 has been held not adequate notice to third parties, al-
though it may suffice as identification of the property between
the parties. If the instrument describes land other than that
intended to be conveyed, it does not give notice to third persons.
Thus, an error in the range number will not put third parties on
notice although the vendor owned but one tract of land.42 Nor
39. Allen v. Butler, 60 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952). For a later
stage of this litigation, see Allen v. Butler, 119 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960). See also Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 747,
750, 105 So. 2d 392, 405, 407 (1958), in which the dissenting members of the
court attacked the majority decision that plaintiff had recovered on the strength
of his own title.
40. Daigle v. Calcasieu Nat'l Bank, 200 La. 1006, 9 So. 2d 394 (1942) ; White
v. Ouachita Natural Gas Co., 177 La. 1052, 150 So. 15 (1933); Consolidated
Ass'n of Planters v. Mason, 24 La. Ann. 718 (1872) ; Hargrove v. Hodge, 9 La.
App. 434, 121 So. 224 (1928). In the White case the court said: "Of course
where the description in the recorded deed is so misleading that it actually de-
scribes accurately some other property than that mortgaged or sold, a purchaser
is not only not put on his guard thereby, but is actually put off his guard, and
in such case a resort to outside evidence would have the effect not merely of mak-
ing the description certain, but of actually changing the record; and this cannot
be allowed." Id. at 1060, 150 So. at 17. See Comment, Registration of Title to
Immovables in Louisiana, 32 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1958), in which it is stated that
a property description, although incomplete or incorrect, constitutes notice if it
raises a doubt in the third party's mind, in which case he will have to go beyond
the public records to determine the identity of the property.
41. Green Brothers v. Witherspoon, 37 La. Ann. 751 (1885).
42. Quatre Parish Co. v. Beauregard Parish School Board, 220 La. 592, 57
So.2d 197 (1952).
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can third parties be held to know that an error has been made in
the number of the section or of the square.43
Generally parol evidence may not be introduced to the preju-
dice of third-party purchasers who have purchased on the
strength of the public records. 44 Third-party purchasers have,
on the other hand, been permitted to introduce parol evidence to
show mistake or error. 45 Also, when the description in a deed
to a third party contains an obvious mistake, as a stenographic
error in copying a range number, the correct description in a
prior deed may be introduced on the plea of error.46 But when
a vendee relies on prescription, it has been held that opposing
third persons who acquired in good faith have only to look to
their act of sale itself and are not required to refer to other
documents or proceedings to support their claims. 47
CONCLUSION
In sales of real property problems concerning description of
the land conveyed perennially occasion both litigation and re-
search. A solution to some of the problems lies in recognizing
that as to transactions between the parties and the basis for
prescription the requirement of identification of the property
in writing does not refer to the written act of sale alone. If the
identity of the object is established with sufficient certainty by
the writing in the act of sale or by other writings referred to in
43. Hans v. Fontenot, 132 La. 812, 61 So. 831 (1913) ; Roussel v. Railways
Realty Co., 132 La. 379, 61 So. 409 (1912).
44. MeDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909). Of course, parol is
not admissible between the parties to establish identity, but only to locate prop-
erty identified in the writing. However, in McDuffie, where the rule was enun-
ciated, the problem was not that identity was uncertain, but that the identifying
description was not recorded.
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 847 (1870) ; Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So.
242 (1933) ; Blackwell v. Nagy, 122 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
46. Ducre v. Milner, 169 La. 819, 126 So. 72 (1930) ; Broussard v. Succession
of Broussard, 164 La. 913, 114 So. 834 (1927); Nelson, Curtis & Nelson v.
Bridgeman, 152 La. 190, 203, 92 So. 855, 860 (1922). In the last case, the court
said: "While the law recognizes that error may creep in, and that land may be
omitted that it was the intention to transfer, and in proper instances will grant
relief, yet the evidence, to justify the granting of it, must be clear and convincing,
and not leave the matter to grave doubt, or make it merely probable that land
was erroneously omitted."
47. Dawidoff v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 2 F.2d 370 (W.D. La. 1924) ; Smith
v. Taylor, 226 La. 235, 75 So. 2d 850 (1954). In the last case, Taylor, an ab-
stractor, discovered an error in the recorded description, the error being that
plaintiff's petition did not affirmatively show that the obligation sued on had
matured prior to the time citation was waived and judgment confessed against
the original vendee. 'Smith bought the property at a sheriff's sale. Taylor, after
discovering the error, bought from the original vendee. The court disallowed plain-
tiff's plea of prescription, holding prescription inapplicable to an absolute nullity.
COMMENTS
it, parol evidence is admissible to locate the property. With re-
spect to intervening rights of third parties, the problem is
whether the description in the recorded act of sale sufficiently
identifies the property to put third parties on notice of prior
transactions involving the property. The identifying descrip-
tion required for this purpose must often be more specific than
that required between the parties. The attributes of a written
description which identifies the property sufficiently to meet
each of these situations cannot be conclusively stated; the situa-
tion has apparently not changed since 1872 when the Supreme
Court said: "We are not prepared to fix the line between valid
and invalid or sufficient and insufficient descriptions, which
shall serve as a guide in all future cases. Each case must depend




Complex division in the ownership of petroleum production
is the rule rather than the exception. The speculative value of
undeveloped minerals; the prevalence of the oil and gas lease,
with its provision for the lessor's royalty, as the means by which
the developer acquires his interest; the use of the overriding
royalty and the production payment as vehicles for profit in
lease brokerage and as means of obtaining financing for devel-
opment; all contribute to the difficult problem of apportioning
the revenue from mineral production in the petroleum industry. 2
The instruments by which various parties have acquired their
respective interests in the production should, of course, govern
the apportionment of the revenues of production. But the un-
48. Consolidated Ass'n of Planters v. Mason, 24 La. Ann. 518, 520 (1872).
1. For purposes of this paper any party entitled to a share in production
revenues is considered a royalty owner. "Seller" and "purchaser," unless other-
wise indicated, refer to the royalty owner as seller and the pipeline owner as
purchaser under the royalty division order. "Lessor" will be substituted for
"seller" when referring to royalty payment rights under a lease.
2. E.g., divided ownership may result from a lessor's 1/8 lease royalty (Cheek
v. Metzer, 116 Tex. 356, 291 S.W. 860 (1927)), subsequent conveyances (Texas
Co. v. Leach, 219 La. 613, 53 So. 2d 786 (1951)), or unitization (Dobbins v.
Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So. 2d 26 (1945) ; Robinson v. Horton, 197 La. 919, 2
So. 2d 647 (1941)). One oil property in the Oklahoma City Field is reportedly
shared by 750 royalty owners. GLASSMIRE, OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES
312, § 83 (2d ed. 1938).
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